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Abstract
In this paper, which is a continuation of the discrete time paper [4], we
develop a theory for continuous time stochastic control problems which,
in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit
a Bellman optimality principle. We study these problems within a game
theoretic framework, and we look for Nash subgame perfect equilibrium
points. For a general controlled continuous time Markov process and a
fairly general objective functional we derive an extension of the standard
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, in the form of a system of non-linear
equations, for the determination for the equilibrium strategy as well as the
equilibrium value function. As applications of the general theory we study
non exponential discounting, various types of mean variance problems, a
point process example, as well as a time inconsistent linear quadratic regu-
lator. We also present a study of time inconsistency within the framework
of a general equilibrium production economy of Cox-Ingersoll-Ross type
[6].
Keywords Time consistency, time inconsistency, time inconsistent con-
trol, dynamic programming, stochastic control, Bellman equation, hyper-
bolic discounting, mean-variance, equilibrium
AMS Code 49L, 60J, 91A, 91G
JEL Code C61, C72, C73, G11,
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study a class of stochastic control problems in
continuous time, which have the property of being time-inconsistent in the sense
that they do not allow for a Bellman optimality principle. As a consequence
of this, the very concept of optimality becomes problematic, since a strategy
which is optimal given a specific starting point in time and space, may be non-
optimal when viewed from a later date and a different state. In this paper
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we attack a fairly general class of time inconsistent problems by using a game-
theoretic approach, so instead of searching for optimal strategies we search for
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies. The paper presents a continuous
time version of the discrete time theory developed in our previous paper [4].
Since we will build heavily on the discrete time paper, the reader is referred
to that paper for motivating examples and for more detailed discussions on
conceptual issues.
1.1 Previous literature
For a detailed discussion of the game theoretic approach to time inconsistency
using Nash equilibrium points as above the reader is referred to [4]. A list of
some of the most important papers on the subject is given by [2], [7], [8], [9],
[10], [11], [15], [18], [19], [20], [21], and [23].
All the papers above deal with particular model choices, and different
authors use different methods in order to solve the problems. To our knowledge,
the present paper, which is the continuous time part of the working paper [3],
is the first attempt to derive a reasonably general (albeit Markovian) theory of
time inconsistent control in continuous time. We would, however, like to stress
that for the present paper we have been greatly inspired by [2], [8], and [10].
1.2 Structure of the paper
The structure of the paper is roughly as follows.
• In Section 2 we present the basic setup, and in Section 3 we discuss the
concept of equilibrium. This concept replaces, in our setting, the optimal-
ity concept for a standard stochastic control problem, and in Definition 3.2
we give a precise definition of the equilibrium control and the equilibrium
value function.
• Since the equilibrium concept in continuous time is quite delicate, we build
the continuous time theory on the discrete time theory previously devel-
oped in [4]. In Section 4 we start to study the continuous time problem
by going to the limit for a discretized problem, and using the results from
[4]. This leads to an extension of the standard HJB equation to a system
of equations with an embedded static optimization problem. The limit-
ing procedure described above is done in an informal manner. It is largely
heuristic, and it thus remains to clarify precisely how the derived extended
HJB system is related to the precisely defined equilibrium problem under
consideration.
• The needed clarification is in fact delivered in Section 5. In Theorem
5.1, which is the main theoretical result of the paper, we give a precise
statement and proof of a verification theorem. This theorem says that a
solution to the extended HJB system does indeed deliver the equilibrium
control and equilibrium value function to our original problem.
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• In Section 6 the results of Section 5 are extended to a more general reward
functional.
• In Section 7 we study some extensions of the theory.
• In Section 8 we prove that for every time inconsistent problem there exists
an associated standard (i.e. time consistent) control problem which in very
strong sense is equivalent to the time inconsistent problem.
• In Sections 9-12 we study some examples to illustrate how the theory
works in a number of concrete cases.
• Section 13 is devoted to a rather detailed study of a general equilibrium
model for a production economy with time inconsistent preferences.
2 The model
We now turn to the formal continuous time theory. In order to present this we
need some input data.
Definition 2.1 The following objects are given exogenously.
1. A drift mapping µ : R+ ×R
n ×Rk → Rn.
2. A diffusion mapping σ : R+ ×R
n ×Rk → M(n, d), where M(n, d) de-
notes the set of all n× d matrices.
3. A control constraint mapping U : R+ ×R
n → 2R
k
4. A mapping F : Rn ×Rn → R.
5. A mapping G : Rn ×Rn → R.
We now consider, on the time interval [0, T ], a controlled SDE of the form
dXt = µ(t,Xt, ut)dt+ σ(t,Xt, ut)dWt. (1)
where the state processX is n-dimensional, the Wiener processW is d-dimensional,
and the control process u is k-dimensional, with the constraint ut ∈ U(t,Xt).
Loosely speaking our object is to maximize, for every initial point (t, x), a
reward functional of the form
Et,x [F (x,XT )] +G (x,Et,x [XT ]) . (2)
This functional is not of a form which is suitable for dynamic programming,
and it will be discussed in detail below, but first we need to specify our class
of controls. In this paper we restrict the controls to admissible feedback
control laws.
Definition 2.2 An admissible control law is a map u : [0, T ]×Rn → Rk
satisfying the following conditions:
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1. For each (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn we have u(t, x) ∈ U(t, x).
2. For each initial point (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn the SDE
dXt = µ(t,Xt,u(t,Xt))dt+ σ(t,Xt,u(t,Xt))dWt. (3)
has a unique strong solution denoted by Xu.
The class of admissible control laws is denoted by U We will sometimes use the
notation ut(x) instead of u(t, x).
We now go on to define the controlled infinitesimal generator of the SDE
above. In the present paper we use the (somewhat non-standard) convention
that the infinitesimal operator acts on the time variable as well as on the space
variable, so it includes the term ∂∂t . The reason for this notational convention
is to have formal similarity of the continuous time theory with the discrete time
theory of [4]. It will facilitate some arguments below considerably.
Definition 2.3 Consider the SDE (1), and let ′ denote matrix transpose.
• For any fixed u ∈ Rk, the functions µu, σu and Cu are defined by
µu(t, x) = µ(t, x, u),
σu(t, x) = σ(t, x, u),
Cu(t, x) = σ(t, x, u)σ(t, x, u)′.
• For any admissible control law u, the functions µu, σu, Cu(t, x) are de-
fined by
µu(t, x) = µ(t, x,u(t, x)),
σu(t, x) = σ(t, x,u(t, x)),
Cu(t, x) = σ(t, x,u(t, x))σ(t, x,u(t, x))′ .
• For any fixed u ∈ Rk, the operator Au is defined by
Au =
∂
∂t
+
n∑
i=1
µui (t, x)
∂
∂xi
+
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
Cuij(t, x)
∂2
∂xi∂xj
.
• For any admissible control law u, the operator Au is defined by
Au =
∂
∂t
+
n∑
i=1
µui (t, x)
∂
∂xi
+
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
Cuij(t, x)
∂2
∂xi∂xj
.
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3 Problem formulation
In order to formulate our problem we need an objective functional. We thus
consider the two functions F and G from Definition 2.1.
Definition 3.1 For a fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, and a fixed admissible control
law u, the corresponding reward functional J is defined by
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [F (x,X
u
T )] +G (x,Et,x [X
u
T ]) . (4)
Remark 3.1 In Section 6 we will consider a more general reward functional.
The restriction to the functional (4) above is done in order to minimize the no-
tational complexity of the derivations below, which otherwise would be somewhat
messy.
In order to have a non degenerate problem we need a formal integrability as-
sumption.
Assumption 3.1 We assume that for each initial point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn,
and each admissible control law u, we have
Et,x [|F (x,X
u
T )|] <∞, Et,x [|X
u
T |] <∞
and hence
G (x,Et,x [X
u
T ]) <∞.
Our objective is loosely that of maximizing J(t, x,u) for each (t, x), but
conceptually this turns out to be far from trivial, so instead of optimal controls
we will study equilibrium controls. The equilibrium concept is made precise in
Definition 3.2 below, but in order to motivate that definition we need a brief
discussion concerning the reward functional above.
We immediately note that, compared to a standard optimal control prob-
lem, the family of reward functionals above are not connected by a Bellman
optimality principle. The reasons for this are as follows:
• The present state x appears in the function F .
• In the second term we have (even apart from the appearance of the present
state x), a nonlinear function G operating on the expected value Et,x [X
u
T ].
Since we do not have a Bellman optimality principle it is in fact unclear what we
would mean by the term “optimal”, since the optimality concept would differ
at different initial times t and for different initial states x.
The approach taken in this paper is to look at the problem from a game
theoretic perspective, and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points.
This will be given a precise definition below, but loosely speaking we view the
game as follows:
• Consider a non-cooperative game, where we have one player for each point
in time t. We refer to this player as “Player t”.
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• For each fixed t, Player t can only control the process X exactly at time
t. He/she does that by choosing a control function u(t, ·), so the action
taken at time t with state Xt is given by u(t,Xt).
• Gluing together the control functions for all players we thus have a feed-
back control law u : [0, T ]×Rn → Rk.
• Given the feedback law u, the reward to Player t is given by the reward
functional
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [F (x,X
u
T )] +G (x,Et,x [X
u
T ])
An informal (and slightly naive) definition of an equilibrium for this game would
be to say that a feedback control law uˆ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
if, for each t, it has the following property:
• If for each s > t, Player s chooses the control uˆ(s, ·), then it is optimal for
Player t to choose uˆ(t, ·).
A definition like this works well in discrete time, but in continuous time this is
not a bona fide definition. Since Player t can only choose the control ut exactly
at time t, he only influences the control on a time set of Lebesgue measure zero,
so for a controlled SDE of the form (1) the control chosen by an individual
player will have no effect whatsoever on the dynamics of the process. We thus
need another definition of the equilibrium concept, and we will in fact follow an
approach first taken by [8] and [10]. The formal definition of equilibrium is now
as follows.
Definition 3.2 Consider an admissible control law uˆ (informally viewed as a
candidate equilibrium law). Choose an arbitrary admissible control law u ∈ U
and a fixed real number h > 0. Also fix an arbitrarily chosen initial point (t, x).
Define the control law uh by
uh(s, y) =
{
u(s, y), for t ≤ s < t+ h, y ∈ Rn,
uˆ(s, y), for t+ h ≤ s ≤ T, y ∈ Rn.
If
lim inf
h→0
J(t, x, uˆ)− J(t, x,uh)
h
≥ 0,
for all u ∈ U, we say that uˆ is an equilibrium control law. Corresponding to
the equilibrium law uˆ we define the equilibrium value function V by
V (t, x) = J(t, x, uˆ).
We will sometimes refer to this as an intrapersonal equilibrium, since it can be
viewed as a game between different future manifestations of you own preferences.
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Remark 3.2 This is our continuous time formalization of the corresponding
discrete time equilibrium concept.
Note the necessity of dividing by h, since for most models we trivially would
have
lim
h→0
{J(t, x, uˆ)− J(t, x,uh)} = 0.
We also note that we do not get a perfect correspondence with the discrete
time equilibrium concept, since if the limit above equals zero for all u ∈ U, it is
not clear that this corresponds to a maximum or just to a stationary point.
Remark 3.3 There may exist multiple equilibria, so the equilibrium value func-
tion should strictly be denoted by V (t, x, uˆ) but we use V (t, x) for ease of nota-
tion.
4 An informal derivation of the extended HJB
equation
We now assume that there exists an equilibrium control law uˆ (not necessarily
unique) and we go on to derive an extension of the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (henceforth HJB) equation for the determination of the corresponding
value function V . To clarify the logical structure of the derivation we outline
our strategy as follows.
• We discretize (to some extent) the continuous time problem. We then use
our results from discrete time theory to obtain a discretized recursion for
uˆ and we then let the time step tend to zero.
• In the limit we obtain our continuous time extension of the HJB equation.
Not surprisingly it will in fact be a system of equations.
• In the discretizing and limiting procedure we mainly rely on informal
heuristic reasoning. In particular we have do not claim that the derivation
is a rigorous one. The derivation is, from a logical point of view, only of
motivational value.
• In Section 5 we then go on to show that our (informally derived) extended
HJB equation is in fact the “correct” one, by proving a rigorous verification
theorem.
4.1 Deriving the equation
In this section we will, in an informal and heuristic way, derive a continuous
time extension of the HJB equation. Note again that we have no claims to rigor
in the derivation, which is only motivational. To this end we assume that there
exists an equilibrium law uˆ and we argue as follows.
• Choose an arbitrary initial point (t, x). Also choose a “small” time incre-
ment h > 0 and an arbitrary admissible control u.
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• Define the control law uh on the time interval [t, T ] by
uh(s, y) =
{
u(s, y), for t ≤ s < t+ h, y ∈ Rn,
uˆ(s, y), for t+ h ≤ s ≤ T, y ∈ Rn.
• If now h is “small enough” we expect to have
J(t, x,uh) ≤ J(t, x, uˆ),
and in the limit as h→ 0 we should have equality if u(t, x) = uˆ(t, x).
We now refer to the discrete time results, as well as the notation, from Theorem
3.13 of [4], with n and n + 1 replaced by t and t + h. We then obtain the
inequality
(AuhV ) (t, x)−(A
u
hf) (t, x, x)+(A
u
hf
x) (t, x)−Auh (G ⋄ g) (t, x)+(H
u
hg) (t, x) ≤ 0
Here we have used the following notation from [4].
• For any fixed y ∈ Rn the mapping fy : [0, T ]×Rn → R is defined by
fy(t, x) = Et,x
[
F
(
y,X uˆT
)]
• The function f : [0, T ]×Rn ×Rn → R is defined by
f(t, x, y) = fy(t, x).
We will also, with a slight abuse of notation, denote the entire family of
functions {fy; y ∈ Rn} by f .
• For any function k(t, x) the operator Auh is defined by
(Auhk) (t, x) = Et,x
[
k(t+ h,Xut+h)
]
− k(t, x).
• The function g : [0, T ]×Rn → Rn is defined by
g(t, x) = Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
.
• The function G ⋄ g is defined by
(G ⋄ g) (t, x) = G (x, g(t, x))
• The term Huhg is defined by
(Huhg) (t, x) = G(x,Et,x
[
g(t+ h,Xut+h)
]
)−G(x, g(t, x)).
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We now divide the inequality by h and let h tend to zero. The the operator
Auh will converge to the infinitesimal operator A
u, where u = u(t, x) but the
limit of h−1 (Huhg) (t, x) requires closer investigation.
From the definition of the infinitesimal operator we have the approximation
Et,x
[
g(t+ h,Xut+h)
]
= g(t, x) +Aug(t, x) + o(h),
and using a standard Taylor approximation for Gx we obtain
G(x,Et,x
[
g(t+ h,Xut+h
]
) = G(x, g(t, x)) +Gy(x, g(t, x)) ·A
ug(t, x) + o(h),
where
Gy(x, y) =
∂G
∂y
(x, y).
We thus obtain
lim
h→0
1
h
(Huhg) (t, x) = Gy(x, g(t, x)) ·A
ug(t, x).
Collecting all results we arrive at our proposed extension of the HJB equation.
To stress the fact that the arguments above are largely informal we state the
equation as a definition rather than as proposition.
Definition 4.1 The extended HJB system of equations for V , f , and g, is
defined as follows.
1. The function V is determined by
sup
u∈U(t,x)
{(AuV ) (t, x)− (Auf) (t, x, x) + (Aufx) (t, x) (5)
− Au (G ⋄ g) (t, x) + (Hug) (t, x)} = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
V (T, x) = F (x, x) +G(x, x).
2. For every fixed y ∈ Rn the function (t, x) 7−→ fy(t, x) is defined by
Auˆfy(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (6)
fy(T, x) = F (y, x).
3. The function g is defined by
Auˆg(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (7)
g(T, x) = x.
We now have some comments on the extended HJB system.
• The first point to notice is that we have a system of equations (5)-(7) for
the simultaneous determination of V , f and g.
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• In the expressions above, uˆ always denotes the control law which realizes
the supremum in the first equation.
• The equations (6)-(7) are the Kolmogorov backward equations for the
expectations
fy(t, x) = Et,x
[
F
(
y,X uˆT
)]
,
g(t, x) = Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
.
• In order to solve the V -equation we need to know f and g but these are
determined by the equilibrium control law uˆ, which in turn is determined
by the sup-part of the V -equation.
• We have used the notation
f(t, x, y) = fy(t, x)
(G ⋄ g) (t, x) = G(x, g(t, x)),
Hug(t, x) = Gy(x, g(t, x)) ·A
ug(t, x),
Gy(x, y) =
∂G
∂y
(x, y).
• The operator Au only operates on variables within parenthesis. Thus
the expression (Auf) (t, x, x) is interpreted as (Auh) (t, x) with h defined
by h(t, x) = f(t, x, x). In the expression (Aufy) (t, x) the operator does
not act on the upper case index y, which is viewed as a fixed parameter.
Similarly, in the expression (Aufx) (t, x), the operator only acts on the
variables t, x within the parenthesis, and does not act on the upper case
index x.
• In the case when F (x, y) does not depend upon x, and there is no G term,
the problem trivializes to a standard time consistent problem. The terms
(Auf) (t, x, x) + (Aufx) (t, x) in the V -equation cancel, and the system
reduces to the standard Bellman equation
(AuV ) (t, x) = 0,
V (T, x) = F (x).
• We note that the g function above appears, in a more restricted framework,
already in [2], [8], and [10].
4.2 Existence and uniqueness
The task of proving existence and/or uniqueness of solutions to the extended
HJB system seems (at least to us) to be technically extremely difficult. We have
no idea about how to proceed so we leave it for future research. It is thus very
much an open problem.
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5 A Verification Theorem
As we have noted above, the derivation of the continuous time extension of the
HJB equation in the previous section was very informal. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to expect that the system in Definition 4.1 will indeed determine the
equilibrium value function V , but so far nothing has been formally proved. The
following two conjectures are, however, natural.
1. Assume that there exists an equilibrium law uˆ and that V is the corre-
sponding value function. Assume furthermore that V is in C1,2. Define
fy and g by
fy(t, x) = Et,x
[
F (y,X uˆT )
]
, (8)
g(t, x) = Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
. (9)
We then conjecture that V satisfies the extended HJB system and that uˆ
realizes the supremum in the equation.
2. Assume that V , f , and g solves the extended HJB system and that the
supremum in the V -equation is attained for every (t, x). We then conjec-
ture that there exists an equilibrium law uˆ, and that it is given by the
maximizing u in the V -equation. Furthermore we conjecture that V is
the corresponding equilibrium value function, and f and g allow for the
interpretations (8)-(9).
In this paper we do not attempt to prove the first conjecture. Even for a
standard time consistent control problem within an SDE framework, it is well
known that this is technically quite complicated, and it typically requires the
theory of viscosity solutions. We will, however, prove the second conjecture.
This obviously has the form of a verification result, and from standard theory
we would expect that it can be proved with a minimum of technical complexity.
We now give the precise formulation and proof of the verification theorem, but
first we need to define a function space.
Definition 5.1 Consider an arbitrary admissible control u ∈ U. A function
h : R+ ×R
n → R is said to belong to the space L2(Xu) if it satisfies the
condition
Et,x
[∫ T
t
‖hx(s,X
u
s )σ
u(s,Xus )‖
2ds
]
<∞ (10)
for every (t, x). In this expression hx denotes the gradient of h in the x-variable.
We can now state and prove the main result of the present paper.
Theorem 5.1 (Verification Theorem) Assume that (for all y) the functions
V (t, x), fy(t, x), g(t, x), and uˆ(t, x) have the following properties.
1. V , fy, and g solves the extended HJB system in Definition 4.1.
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2. V (t, x), and g(t, x) are smooth in the sense that they are in C1,2, and
f(t, x, y) is in C1,2,2.
3. The function uˆ realizes the supremum in the V equation, and uˆ is an
admissible control law.
4. V , fy, g, and G ⋄ g, as well as the function (t, x) 7−→ f(t, x, x) all belong
to the space L2(X uˆ).
Then uˆ is an equilibrium law, and V is the corresponding equilibrium value
function. Furthermore, f and g can be interpreted according to (8)-(9).
Proof. The proof consists of two steps:
• We start by showing that f and g have the interpretations (8)-(9) and that
V is the value function corresponding to uˆ, i.e. that V (t, x) = J(t, x, uˆ).
• In the second step we then prove that uˆ is indeed an equilibrium control
law.
To show that f and g have the interpretations (8)-(9) we apply the Ito for-
mula to the processes fy(s,X uˆs ) and g(s,X
uˆ
s ). Using (6)-(7) and the assumed
integrability conditions for fy and g, it follows that the processes fy(s,X uˆs )
and g(s,X uˆs ) are martingales, so from the boundary conditions for f
y and g we
obtain our desired representations of fy and g as
fy(t, x) = Et,x
[
F (y,X uˆT )
]
, (11)
g(t, x) = Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
. (12)
To show that V (t, x) = J(t, x, uˆ), we use the V equation (5) to obtain:(
AuˆV
)
(t, x)−
(
Auˆf
)
(t, x, x) +
(
Auˆfx
)
(t, x)
−Auˆ (G ⋄ g) (t, x) +
(
Huˆg
)
(t, x) = 0, (13)
where
Huˆg(t, x) = Gy(x, g(t, x)) ·A
uˆg(t, x).
Since f , and g satisfies (6)-(7), we have(
Auˆfx
)
(t, x) = 0,
Auˆg(t, x) = 0,
so (13) takes the form(
AuˆV
)
(t, x) =
(
Auˆf
)
(t, x, x) +Auˆ (G ⋄ g) (t, x) (14)
for all t and x.
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We now apply the Ito formula to the process V (s,X uˆs ). Integrating and
taking expectations gives us
Et,x
[
V (T,X uˆT )
]
= V (t, x) + Et,x
[∫ T
t
AuˆV (s,X uˆs )ds
]
,
where the stochastic integral part has vanished because of the integrability con-
dition V ∈ L2(X uˆ). Using (14) we thus obtain
Et,x
[
V (T,X uˆT )
]
= V (t, x)+Et,x
[∫ T
t
Auˆf(s,X uˆs , X
uˆ
s ds)
]
+Et,x
[∫ T
t
Auˆ (G ⋄ g) (s,X uˆs )ds
]
.
In the same way we obtain
Et,x
[∫ T
t
Auˆf(s,X uˆs , X
uˆ
s )ds
]
= Et,x
[
f(T,X uˆT , X
uˆ
T )
]
− f(t, x, x),
Et,x
[∫ T
t
Auˆ (G ⋄ g) (s,X uˆs )ds
]
= Et,x
[
G(XT , g(T,X
uˆ
T ))
]
−G(x, g(t, x)).
Using this and the boundary conditions for V , f , and g we get
Et,x
[
F (X uˆT , X
uˆ
T ) +G(X
uˆ
T , X
uˆ
T )
]
= V (t, x) + Et,x
[
F (X uˆT , X
uˆ
T )
]
− f(t, x, x)
+ Et,x
[
G(X uˆT , X
uˆ
T )
]
−G(x, g(t, x)),
i.e.
V (t, x) = f(t, x, x) +G(x, g(t, x)). (15)
Plugging (11)-(12) into (15) we get
V (t, x) = Et,x
[
F (x,X uˆT )
]
+G(x,Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
)).
so we obtain the desired result
V (t, x) = J(t, x, uˆ).
We now go on to show that uˆ is indeed an equilibrium law, but first we
need a small temporary definition. For any admissible control law u we define
fu and gu by
fu(t, x, y) = Et,x [F (y,X
u
T )] ,
gu(t, x) = Et,x [X
u
T ] .
so, in particular we have f = f uˆ and g = guˆ. For any h > 0, and any admissible
control law u ∈ U, we now construct the control law uh defined in Definition
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3.2. From Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 8.8 in [4], applied to the points t and t + h
we obtain
J(t, x,uh) = Et,x
[
J(t+ h,Xuht+h,uh)
]
−
{
Et,x
[
fuh(t+ h,Xuht+h, X
uh
t+h)
]
− Et,x
[
fuh(t+ h,Xuht+h, x)
]}
−
{
Et,x
[
G
(
Xuht+h, g
uh(t+ h,Xuht+h)
)]
−G
(
x,Et,x
[
guh(t+ h,Xuht+h)
])}
.
Since uh = u on [t, t+ h], we have X
uh
t+h = X
u
t+h, and since uh = uˆ on [t+ h, T ]
we have
J(t+ h,Xuht+h,uh) = V (t+ h,X
u
t+h),
fuh(t+ h,Xuht+h, X
uh
t+h) = f(t+ h,X
u
t+h, X
u
t+h),
fuh(t+ h,Xuht+h, x) = f(t+ h,X
u
t+h, x),
guh(t+ h,Xuht+h) = g(t+ h,X
u
t+h),
so we obtain
J(t, x,uh) = Et,x
[
V (t+ h,Xut+h)
]
−
{
Et,x
[
f(t+ h,Xut+h, X
u
t+h)
]
− Et,x
[
f(t+ h,Xut+h, x)
]}
−
{
Et,x
[
G
(
Xut+h, g(t+ h,X
u
t+h)
)]
−G
(
x,Et,x
[
g(t+ h,Xut+h)
])}
.
Furthermore, from the V -equation (5) we have
(AuV ) (t, x) − (Auf) (t, x, x) + (Aufx) (t, x)
−Au (G ⋄ g) (t, x) + (Hug) (t, x) ≤ 0,
where we have used the notation u = u(t, x). This gives us
Et,x
[
V (t+ h,Xut+h)
]
− V (t, x) −
{
Et,x
[
f(t,Xut+h, X
u
t+h)
]
− f(t, x, x)
}
+Et,x
[
f(t,Xut+h, x)
]
− f(t, x, x)
−Et,x
[
G
(
t+ h, g(t+ h,Xut+h)
)]
+G(x, g(t, x))
+G
(
x,Et,x
[
g(t+ h,Xut+h)
])
−G(x, g(t, x)) ≤ o(h),
or, after simplification,
V (t, x) ≥ Et,x
[
V (t+ h,Xut+h)
]
− Et,x
[
f(t,Xut+h, X
u
t+h)
]
+ Et,x
[
f(t,Xut+h, x)
]
− Et,x
[
G
(
t+ h, g(t+ h,Xut+h)
)]
+G
(
x,Et,x
[
g(t+ h,Xut+h)
])
+ o(h).
Combining this with the expression for J(t, x,uh) above, and the fact that (as
we have proved) V (t, x) = J(t, x, uˆ), we obtain
J(t, x, uˆ)− J(t, x,uh) ≥ o(h),
so
lim inf
h→0
J(t, x, uˆ)− J(t, x,uh)
h
≥ 0,
and we are done.
16
6 The general case
We now turn to the most general case of the present paper, where the functional
J is given by
J(t, x,u) = Et,x
[∫ T
t
H (t, x, s,Xus ,us(X
u
s )) ds+ F (t, x,X
u
T )
]
+ G (t, x, Et,x [X
u
T ]) . (16)
To study the reward functional above we need a slightly modified integrability
assumption.
Assumption 6.1 We assume that for each initial point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn,
and each admissible control law u, we have
Et,x
[∫ T
t
|H (t, x, s,Xus ,us(X
u
s ))|ds+ |F (x,X
u
T )|
]
< ∞, (17)
Et,x [|X
u
T |] < ∞. (18)
The treatment of this case is very similar to the previous one, so we directly
give the final result, which is the relevant extended HJB system.
Definition 6.1 Given the objective functional (16) the extended HJB system
for V is given by (19)-(24) below.
1. The function V is determined by
sup
u∈Rk
{(AuV ) (t, x) +H(t, x, t, x, u)− (Auf)(t, x, t, x) + (Auf tx)(t, x) (19)
− Au (G ⋄ g) (t, x) + (Hug) (t, x)} = 0,
with boundary condition
V (T, x) = F (T, x, x) +G(T, x, x). (20)
2. For each fixed s and y, the function f sy(t, x) is defined by
Auˆf sy(t, x) +H(s, y, t, x, uˆt(x)) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (21)
f sy(T, x) = F (s, y, x) (22)
3. The function g(t, x) is defined by
Auˆg(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (23)
g(T, x) = x. (24)
17
In the definition above, uˆ always denotes the control law which realizes the
supremum in the V equation, and we have used the notation
f(t, x, s, y) = f sy(t, x),
(G ⋄ g) (t, x) = G(t, x, g(t, x)),
Hug(t, x) = Gy(t, x, g(t, x)) ·A
ug(t, x),
Gy(t, x, y) =
∂G
∂y
(t, x, y).
Also for this case we have a verification theorem. The proof is almost
identical to that of Theorem 5.1 so we omit it.
Theorem 6.1 (Verification Theorem) Assume that, for all (s, y), the func-
tions V (t, x), f sy(t, x), g(t, x), and uˆ(t, x) have the following properties.
1. V , f sy, and g is a solution to the extended HJB system in Definition 6.1.
2. V , f sy, and g are smooth in the sense that they are in C1,2.
3. The function uˆ realizes the supremum in the V equation, and uˆ is an
admissible control law.
4. V , f sy, g, and G ⋄ g, as well as the function (t, x) 7−→ f(t, x, t, x) all
belong to the space L2(X uˆ).
Then uˆ is an equilibrium law, and V is the corresponding equilibrium value
function. Furthermore, f , and g have the probabilistic representations
f sy(t, x) = Et,x
[∫ T
t
H
(
s, y, r,X uˆr , uˆr(X
uˆ
r )
)
dr + F (s, y,X uˆT )
]
, (25)
g(t, x) = Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (26)
7 Special cases and extensions
In this section we comment on possible extensions and a couple of important
special cases.
7.1 A driving point process
In the present paper we have, for notational clearness, confined ourselves to a
pure diffusion framework. It is, however, very easy to extend the theory to a
case where the SDE, apart from the Wiener process, is also driven by a marked
point process with Markovian characteristics. The extended HJB system will
look exactly the same as above, but the form of the infinitesimal operator Au
will of course change, and we would need to slightly modify the integrability
assumptions.
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7.2 The case when G = 0.
In the case when the term G is not present, the V equation takes the form
sup
u∈Rk
{(AuV ) (t, x) +H(t, x, t, x, u)− (Auf)(t, x, t, x) + (Auf tx)(t, x)} = 0
In this case, however, it follows from the probabilistic representation of f that
f(t, x, t, x) = V (t, x) so we have a cancellation in the V -equation. The HJB
system (19)-(24) is thus replaced by the much simpler system
sup
u∈Rk
{H(t, x, t, x, u) + (Auf tx)(t, x)} = 0, (27)
Auˆf sy(t, x) +H(s, y, t, x, uˆt(x)) = 0, (28)
f sy(T, x) = F (s, y, x). (29)
7.3 Infinite horizon
The results above can easily be extended to the case with infinite horizon, i.e.
when T = +∞. The natural reward functional will then have the form
J(t, x,u) = Et,x
[∫ ∞
t
H (t, x, s,Xus ,us(X
u
s )) ds
]
so the functions F and G are not present. It is easy to see that for this case we
have the extended HJB system
sup
u∈Rk
{(AuV ) (t, x) +H(t, x, t, x, u)− (Auf)(t, x, t, x) + (Auf tx)(t, x)} = 0,
lim
T→∞
Et,x
[
V (T,X uˆT )
]
= 0,
Auˆf sy(t, x) +H(s, y, t, x, uˆt(x)) = 0,
lim
T→∞
Et,x
[
f sy(T,X uˆT )
]
= 0
We also have a verification theorem where the proof is almost identical to the
earlier case.
7.4 Generalizing H and G
We can easily extend the result above to the case when the termG (t, x, Et,x [X
u
T ])
is replaced by
G (t, x, Et,x [k (X
u
T )])
for some function k. In this case we simply define g by
g(t, x) = Et,x
[
k
(
X uˆT
)]
.
The extended HJB system then looks exactly as in Definition 6.1 above, apart
from the fact that the boundary condition for g is changed to
g(T, x) = k(x).
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See [16] for an interesting application.
It is also possible to extend the H term to be of the form
H(t, x, s,Xs, Et,x [b(X
u
s )] , us)
in the integral term of the value functional. The structure of the resulting HJB
system is fairly obvious but we have omitted it since the present HJB system
is, in our opinion, complicated enough as it is.
7.5 The case with no state dependence
We see that the general extended HJB equation is quite complicated. In many
concrete cases there are, however, cancellations between different terms in the
equation. The simplest case occurs when the objective functional has the form
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [F (X
u
T )] +G (Et,x [X
u
T ]) ,
so F and G do not depend on the present state x, and X is a scalar diffusion of
the form
dXt = µ(Xt, ut)dt+ σ(Xt, ut)dWt.
In this case the extended HJB equation has the form
sup
u∈Rk
{AuV (t, x)−Au [G (g(t, x))] +G′(g(t, x))Aug(t, x)} = 0,
and a simple calculation shows that
−Au [G (g(t, x))] +G′(g(t, x))Aug(t, x) = −
1
2
σ2(x, u)G′′(g(t, x))g2x(t, x),
where gx =
∂g
∂x . Thus the extended HJB equation becomes
sup
u∈Rk
{
AuV (t, x)−
1
2
σ2(x, u)G′′(g(t, x))g2x(t, x)
}
= 0, (30)
7.6 A scaling result
In this section we derive a small scaling result. Let us thus consider the objective
functional (16) above and denote, as usual, the equilibrium control and value
function by uˆ and V respectively. Let ϕ : Rn → R be a fixed real valued
function and consider a new objective functional Jϕ, defined by,
Jϕ(t, x,u) = ϕ(x)J(t, x,u), n = 0, 1, . . . , T
and denote the corresponding equilibrium control and value function by uˆϕ
and Vϕ respectively. Since Player t is (loosely speaking) trying to maximize
Jϕ(t, x,u) over ut, and ϕ(x) is just a scaling factor which is not affected by ut
the following result is intuitively obvious. The formal proof is, however, not
quite trivial.
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Proposition 7.1 With notation as above we have
Vϕ(t, x) = ϕ(x)V (t, x),
uˆϕ(t, x) = uˆ(t, x).
Proof. For notational simplicity we consider the case when J is of the form
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [F (x,X
u
T )] +G (x,Et,x [X
u
T ]) . (31)
The proof for the general case has exactly the same structure.
For J as above we have the extended HJB system
sup
u∈Rk
{(AuV ) (t, x)− (Auf) (t, x, x) + (Aufx) (t, x)
− Au (G ⋄ g) (t, x) +Gy(x, g(t, x)) ·A
ug(t, x)} = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Auˆfy(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Auˆg(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
V (T, x) = F (x, x) +G(x, x),
fy(T, x) = F (y, x),
g(T, x) = x.
We now recall the probabilistic interpretations
V (t, x) = Et,x
[
F (x,X uˆT )
]
+G
(
x,Et,x
[
X uˆT
])
f(t, x, y) = Et,x
[
F (y,X uˆT )
]
,
g(t, x) = Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
.
and the definition
(G ⋄ g) (t, x) = G(x, g(t, x)).
From this it follows that
V (t, x) = f(t, x, x) + (G ⋄ g) (t, x),
so the first HJB equation above can be written
sup
u∈Rk
{(Aufx) (t, x) +Gy(x, g(t, x)) ·A
ug(t, x)} = 0.
We now turn to Jϕ, which can be written
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [Fϕ(x,X
u
T )] +Gϕ (x,Et,x [X
u
T ]) ,
where
Fϕ(x, y) = ϕ(x)F (x, y),
Gϕ(x, y) = ϕ(x)G(x, y),
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and we note that
∂Gϕ
∂y
(x, y) = ϕ(x)Gy(x, y)
We thus obtain the HJB equation
sup
u∈Rk
{(
Aufxϕ
)
(t, x) + ϕ(x)Gy(x, gϕ(t, x)) ·A
ugϕ(t, x)
}
= 0,
with fϕ and gϕ defined by
Auˆϕfyϕ(t, x) = 0,
Auˆϕgϕ(t, x) = 0,
fyϕ(T, x) = ϕ(y)F (y, x),
gϕ(T, x) = x.
From this it follows that we can write
fϕ(t, x, y) = ϕ(y)f0(t, x, y),
gϕ(t, x) = g0(t, x)
where
Auˆϕfy0 (t, x) = 0,
Auˆϕg0(t, x) = 0,
fy0 (T, x) = F (y, x),
g0(T, x) = x.
and the HJB equation has the form
sup
u∈Rk
{ϕ(x) (Aufx0 ) (t, x) + ϕ(x)Gy(x, g0(t, x)) ·A
ug0(t, x)} = 0,
or, equivalently,
sup
u∈Rk
{(Aufx0 ) (t, x) +Gy(x, g0(t, x)) ·A
ug0(t, x)} = 0.
We thus see that the system for f , g, and uˆ is exactly the same as that for f0,
g0, and uˆϕ. We thus have
fϕ(t, x, y) = ϕ(y)f(t, x, y),
gϕ(t, x) = g(t, x),
uˆϕ = uˆ.
Moreover, since
Vϕ(t, x) = fϕ(t, x, x) + (Gϕ ⋄ gϕ) (t, x),
we obtain
Vϕ(t, x) = ϕ(x)V (t, x).
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8 An equivalent time consistent problem
The object of the present section is to provide a link between time inconsistent
and time consistent problems. To this end we go back to the general continuous
time extended HJB system (19)-(24). The V -equation (19) reads as
sup
u∈U
{(AuV ) (t, x) +H(t, x, t, x, u)− (Auh)(t, x, t, x) + (Auhtx)(t, x)
− (Auf) (t, x, t, x) +
(
Auf tx
)
(t, x)− Au (G ⋄ g) (t, x) + (Hug) (t, x)} = 0,
Let us now assume that there exists an equilibrium control law uˆ. Using uˆ we
can then construct f and g by solving the associated equations (21)-(24). We
now define the function K by
K(t, x, u) = H(t, x, t, x, u)− (Auh)(t, x, t, x) + (Auhtx)(t, x)
− (Auf) (t, x, x) + (Aufx) (t, x)−Au (G ⋄ g) (t, x) + (Hug) (t, x).
With this definition of K, the equation for V above and its boundary condition
become
sup
u∈U
{(AuV ) (t, x) +K(t, x, u)} = 0,
V (T, x) = F (x, x) +G(x, x).
We now observe, by inspection, that this is a standard HJB equation for the
standard time consistent optimal control problem to maximize
Et,x
[∫ T
t
K(s,Xs, us)ds+ F (XT , XT ) +G(XT , XT )
]
. (32)
We have thus proved the following result.
Proposition 8.1 For every time inconsistent problem in the present frame-
work there exists a standard, time consistent optimal control problem with the
following properties.
• The optimal value function for the standard problem coincides with the
equilibrium value function for the time inconsistent problem.
• The optimal control for the standard problem coincides with the equilibrium
control for the time inconsistent problem.
• The objective functional for the standard problem is given by (32).
We immediately remark that the Proposition above is mostly of theoretical
interest, and of little “practical” value. The reason is of course that in order
to formulate the equivalent standard problem we need to know the equilibrium
control uˆ.
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Related results can be found in [1], [8], [12] and [17]. In these papers it
is proved that, for various models where time inconsistency stems from non-
exponential discounting, there exists an equivalent standard problem (with ex-
ponential discounting).
Proposition 8.1 differs from the results in the cited references above two
ways. Firstly it differs by being quite general and not confined to a particular
model. Secondly it differs from the results in the cited references by having a
different structure. In other words, for the models studied in the cited papers,
the equivalent problem described in Proposition 8.1 is structurally different from
the equivalent problems presented in the cited references. See Section 8.3 of [4]
for a more detailed discussion of issues of this kind.
9 Non exponential discounting
We now illustrate the theory developed above, and the first example we consider
is a fairly general case of a control problem with non exponential discounting.
9.1 The general case
Our general model is specified as follows.
• We consider a controlled, not necessarily time homogeneous, Markov pro-
cess in continuous time with controlled infinitesimal generator Au.
• The value functional for Player t is given by
J(t, c,u) = Etx
[∫ T
t
ϕ(t− s)H(Xus , u (X
u
s ))ds+ ϕ(T − t)Γ (X
u
T )
]
,
where the discounting function ϕ(t), the local utility function H(x, u) and
the final state utility function Γ(x) are deterministic functions.
• We assume that the discounting function ϕ is non-negative and integrable
over [0,∞). Without loss of generality we assume that
ϕ(0) = 1.
In the notation of Definition 6.1 we see that we have no G-term so the extended
HJB equation has the form
sup
u∈U
{(AuV ) (t, x) + C(t, x, t, x, u)−
∫ T
t
(Aucs)(t, x, t, x)ds +
∫ T
t
(Auctxs)(t, x)ds
− (Auf) (t, x, t, x) +
(
Auf tx
)
(t, x)
}
= 0,
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We recall the relations
f sy(t, x) = Et,x
[
F (s, y,X uˆT )
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
f(t, x, t, x) = f tx(t, x),
crys(t, x) = Et,x
[
C
(
r, y, s,X uˆs , uˆ(s,X
uˆ
s )
)]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ r.
cs(t, x, t, x) = csxt(t, x)
as well as the notational convention that the operator Au operates only on
the variables within the parenthesis, whereas upper case indices are treated as
constant parameters. In our case the y variable is not present, so we can write
f sy(t, x) = f s(t, x)
crys(t, x) = crs(t, x)
and the extended HJB equation takes the form
sup
u∈U
{(AuV ) (t, x) + C(t, t, x, u)−
∫ T
t
(Aucs)(t, t, x)ds+
∫ T
t
(Aucts)(t, x)ds
− (Auf) (t, t, x) +
(
Auf t
)
(t, x)
}
= 0,
where
f s(t, x) = Et,x
[
F (s,X uˆT )
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
f(t, t, x) = f t(t, x),
crs(t, x) = Et,x
[
C
(
r, s,X uˆs , uˆ(s,X
uˆ
s )
)]
,
cs(t, t, x) = cts(t, x).
In our case we furthermore have
C(t, s, x, u) = ϕ(s− t)H(x, u),
F (t, x) = ϕ(T − t)Γ(x).
so we can write
f s(t, x) = ϕ(T − s)γ(t, x),
crs(t, x) = ϕ(s− r)hs(t, x),
cs(t, t, x) = ϕ(s− t)hs(t, x)
where γ and h are defined by
γ(t, x) = Et,x
[
Γ(X uˆT )
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
hs(t, x) = Et,x
[
H
(
X uˆs , uˆ(s,X
uˆ
s )
)]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ s.
We now easily obtain
C(t, t, x, u) = H(x, u),
Aucrs(t, x) = ϕ(s− r)Auhs(t, x),
Aucs(t, t, x) = ϕ(s− t)Auhs(t, x)− ϕ′(t− s)hs(t, x),
Auf t(t, x) = ϕ(T − t)Auγs(t, x),
Auf(t, t, x) = ϕ(T − t)Auγ(t, x)− ϕ′(T − t)γ(t, x).
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We have thus proved the following result.
Proposition 9.1 The extended HJB system has the form
sup
u∈U
{
AuV (t, x) +H(x, u) +
∫ T
t
ϕ′(s− t)hs(t, x)ds+ ϕ′(T − t)γ(t, x)
}
= 0,
V (T, x) = Γ(x),
where hs and γ are determined by
Auˆhs(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ s,
Auˆγ(t, x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
hs(s, x) = H (x, uˆ(s, x)) ,
γ(T, x) = Γ(x).
with probabilistic interpretation
γ(t, x) = Et,x
[
Γ(X uˆT )
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
hs(t, x) = Et,x
[
H
(
X uˆs , uˆ(s,X
uˆ
s )
)]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ s.
This generalizes the corresponding results in [8] and [10], where special cases
are treated in great detail.
9.2 Optimal investment and consumption for log utility
In this section we study a concrete example, namely non exponential discounting
for a problem of investment/consumption with log utility.
We consider a market formed by a risky asset with price process S and a
risk free money account with price process B. The price dynamics are given by
dSt = αStdt+ σStdWt,
dBt = rBtdt,
where α and σ are known constants, and r is the constant short rate.
Let ut be the amount of money invested in the risky asset at time t, and
let ct be the consumption in dollars unit time. The value Xt of a self-financing
portfolio based on S and B will then evolve according to the SDE
dXt = [rXt + βut − ct]dt+ σutdWt, (33)
where β = α− r. The controls u and c are of the form u(x), c(x) and our value
functional is given by
J(t, x,u, c) = Et,x
[∫ T
t
ϕ(s− t) ln [c(Xu,cs )] ds+ ϕ(s− t) ln [X
u,c
T ]
]
.
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From Proposition 9.1 we obtain the extended HJB system as
sup
u∈U
{
AuV (t, x) + ln(c) +
∫ T
t
ϕ′(s− t)hs(t, x)ds + ϕ′(T − t)γ(t, x)
}
= 0,
V (T, x) = ln(x),
with probabilistic interpretation
γ(t, x) = Et,x
[
ln(X uˆ,cˆT )
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
hs(t, x) = Et,x
[
ln
(
cˆ(X uˆ,cˆs )
)]
0 ≤ t ≤ s.
The first order conditions of the maximization are given by
cˆ =
1
Vx
,
uˆ = −
β
σ2
Vx
Vxx
.
We now make the Ansatz
V (t, x) = a(t)A ln(x) + d(t)
where a and b are deterministic functions of time. We then obtain
Vt = a˙ ln(x) + b˙, Vx =
a
x
, Vxx = −
a
x2
,
so we have
cˆ(t, x) =
x
a(t)
, uˆ(t, x) =
β
σ2
x.
Given the Ansatz, the equilibrium X dynamics thus take the form
dXt = Xt
[
r +
β2
σ2
−
1
a(t)
]
dt+Xt
β
σ
dWt.
and a simple calculation gives us
hs(t, x) = Et,x
[
ln
(
cˆ(s,X uˆ,cˆs )
)]
= ln(x) +
∫ s
t
b(u)du− ln(a(s)),
where
b(t) = r +
1
2
β2
σ2
−
1
a(t)
and
γ(t, x) = Et,x
[
ln
(
X uˆ,cˆT )
)]
= ln(x) +
∫ T
t
b(u)du,
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We can now plug these expressions into the extended HJB equation and, with
B denoting the primitive function of b, we obtain
a˙ ln(x) + d˙+ ln(x) − ln(a) + ar + a
β2
σ2
− 1− a
1
2
β2
σ2
+ ln(x)
∫ T
t
ϕ′(s− t)ds+
∫ T
t
ϕ′(s− t)B(s)ds −A(t)
∫ T
t
ϕ′(s− t)ds
−
∫ T
t
ϕ′(s− t)a(s)ds+ ϕ′(T − t) ln(x) + ϕ′(T − t) [B(T )−B(t)] = 0
Collecting the log terms we obtain the following ODE for a
a˙+ ϕ(T − t) + ϕ′(T − t) = 0,
a(T ) = 1.
This ODE can obviously be solved directly by integration. The remaining terms
in the HJB equation will give us an ODE for d and, given a, this can also be
integrated directly. The problem is thus solved, and we note that we do not
have to check the PDE:s for hs(t, x) and γ(t, x), since these PDE:s follow directly
from the probabilistic interpretations of h and γ that we have used above. We
thus have the following result
Proposition 9.2 With notation as above, the equilibrium solution is given by
V (t, x) = a(t) ln(x) + d(t), cˆ(t, x) =
x
a(t)
, uˆ(t, x) =
β
σ2
x.
where a is given above.
9.3 Infinite horizon
We now move to the case of infinite horizon and we restrict ourselves to the
case when the controlled Markov process is time invariant. For this case it is
natural to look for a time invariant solution, i.e. to study the case when V is
of the form V (t, x) = V (0, x) = V (x) and when the control u is of the form
u(t, x) = u(0, x) = u(x). We may then set t = 0, and γ = 0 in the extended
HJB system of Proposition 9.1. We furthermore define the function h(t, x) by
h(t, x) = hs+t(s, x) = ht(0, x),
and, after some elementary calculations, we have the following result.
Proposition 9.3 For the time invariant case with infinite horizon, the extended
HJB system has the form
sup
u∈U
{
GuV (x) +H(x, u) +
∫ ∞
0
ϕ′(t)h(t, x)dt
}
= 0,
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where h is determined by
Guˆh(t, x) = 0, t ≥ 0
h(0, x) = H (x, uˆ(x)) ,
with probabilistic interpretation
h(t, x) = E0,x
[
H
(
X uˆt , uˆ(X
uˆ
t )
)]
. t ≥ 0
The operator Gu differs from Au only by the fact that the operator ∂∂t in A
u is
replaced by − ∂∂t in G
u.
Remark 9.1 Since V is not a function of t, we obviously have GuV (x) =
AuV (x), but for the function h(t, x) the difference between Gu and Au does
indeed matter.
Remark 9.2 In the time consistent case of exponential discounting ϕ(t) = e−δt
we have∫ ∞
0
ϕ′(t)h(t, x)dt = −δE0,x
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtH
(
X uˆt , uˆ(X
uˆ
t )
)
dt
]
= −δV (x),
and we have the standard HJB equation
sup
u∈U
{GuV (x) +H(x, u)} = δV (x).
10 Mean-variance control
In this example we will consider dynamic mean variance optimization. This is
a continuous time version of a standard Markowitz investment problem, where
we penalize the risk undertaken by the conditional variance. As noted in the
introduction, in a Wiener driven framework this example is studied intensively
in [2], where the authors also consider the case of multiple assets, as well as the
case of a hidden Markov process (unobservable factors) driving the parameters
of the asset price dynamics. For illustrative purposes we first consider the
simplest possible case of a Wiener driven single risky asset and re-derive the
corresponding results of [2]. We then extend the model in [2] and study the case
when the risky asset is driven by a point process as well as by a Wiener process.
It should be noted that both models under consideration are special cases of the
very general mean-variance theory developed in [7]. We thus make no claim of
originality for these models. They are merely intended as illustrative examples.
10.1 The simplest case
We consider a market formed by a risky asset with price process S and a risk
free money account with price process B. The price dynamics are given by
dSt = αStdt+ σStdWt,
dBt = rBtdt,
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where α and σ are known constants, and r is the constant short rate.
Let ut be the amount of money invested in the risky asset at time t. The
valueXt of a self-financing portfolio based on S and B will then evolve according
to the SDE
dXt = [rXt + (α− r)ut]dt+ σutdWt. (34)
Our value functional is given by
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [X
u
T ]−
γ
2
V art,x (X
u
T ) ,
so we want to maximize expected return with a penalty term for risk. Remem-
bering the definition for the conditional variance
V art,x[XT ] = Et,x[X
2
T ]− E
2
t,x[XT ],
we can re-write our objective functional as
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [F (X
u
T )]−G(Et,x [X
u
T ])
where F (x) = x − γ2x
2 and G(x) = γ2x
2. As seen in the previous sections, the
term G(Et,x [XT ]) leads to a time inconsistent game theoretic problem.
The extended HJB equation is then given by the following PDE system:
sup
u
{
[rx + (α− r)u]Vx +
1
2
σ2u2Vxx −A
u(G ◦ g) +Hug
}
= 0,
V (T, x) = x,
Auˆg = 0,
g(T, x) = x,
where lower case index denotes the corresponding partial derivative. This case
is covered in Section 7.5, and from (30) we can simplify to
Vt + sup
u
{
[rx + (α− r)u]Vx +
1
2
σ2u2Vxx −
γ
2
σ2u2g2x
}
= 0
V (T, x) = x
Auˆg = 0
g(T, x) = x
Given the linear structure of the dynamics, as well as of the boundary
conditions, it is natural to make the Ansatz
V (t, x) = A(t)x +B(t)
g(t, x) = a(t)x + b(t).
With this trial solution the HJB equation becomes
Atx+Bt + sup
u
{
[rx+ (α − r)u]A−
γ
2
σ2u2a2
}
= 0, (35)
30
atx+ bt + [rx + (α− r)uˆ]a = 0, (36)
A(T ) = 1,
B(T ) = 0,
a(T ) = 1,
b(T ) = 0.
We first solve the static problem embedded in (35). From the first order condi-
tion, we obtain the optimal control as
uˆ(t, x) =
1
γ
α− r
σ2
A(t)
a2(t)
,
so the optimal control does not depend on x. Substituting this expression for uˆ
into (35) we obtain:
Atx+Bt +Arx +
1
2γ
(α− r)2
σ2
A2
a2
= 0.
By separation of variables we then get the following system of ODE:s.
At +Ar = 0,
A(T ) = 1,
Bt +
1
2γ
(α− r)2
σ2
A2
a2
= 0,
B(T ) = 0.
We immediately obtain
A(t) = er(T−t).
Inserting this expression for A into the second ODE yields
Bt +
1
2γ
(α− r)2
σ2
e2r(T−t)
a2
= 0, (37)
B(T ) = 0.
This equation contain the unknown function a, and to determine this we use
equation (36). Inserting the expression for uˆ into (36) gives us
atx+ bt + rxa +
1
γ
(α− r)2
σ2
er(T−t)
a
= 0,
a(T ) = 1,
b(T ) = 0.
Again we have separation of variables and obtain the system
at + ar = 0,
bt +
1
γ
(α− r)2
σ2
er(T−t)
a
= 0.
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This yields
a(t) = er(T−t),
and the ODE for b then takes the form
bt =
1
γ
(α − r)2
σ2
,
b(T ) = 0.
We thus have
b(t) =
1
γ
(α− r)2
σ2
(T − t).
Introducing the results in the optimal control formula, we get
uˆ(t, x) =
1
γ
α− r
σ2
e−r(T−t).
Using the expression for a above, we can go back to equation (37) which now
takes the form
Bt +
1
2γ
(α − r)2
σ2
= 0,
so
B(t) =
1
2γ
(α− r)2
σ2
(T − t).
Thus, the optimal value function is given by
V (t, x) = er(T−t)x+
1
2γ
(α− r)2
σ2
(T − t)
We summarize the results as follows:
Proposition 10.1 For the model above we have the following results.
• The optimal amount of money invested in a stock is given by
uˆ(t, x) =
1
γ
α− r
σ2
e−r(T−t).
• The equilibrium value function is given by
V (t, x) = er(T−t)x+
1
2γ
(α− r)2
σ2
(T − t).
• The expected value of the optimal portfolio is given by
Et,x [XT ] = e
r(T−t)x+
1
γ
(α− r)2
σ2
(T − t).
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Using Proposition 8.1 we can also construct the equivalent standard time
consistent optimization problem. An easy calculation gives us the following
result.
Proposition 10.2 The equivalent (in the sense of Proposition 8.1) time con-
sistent problem is to maximize the functional
max
u
Et,x
[
XT −
γσ2
2
∫ T
t
e2r(T−s)u2sds
]
given the dynamics (33).
We note in passing that
σ2u2tdt = d〈X〉t.
10.2 A point process extension
We will now present an extension of the mean variance problem when the stock
dynamics are driven by a jump diffusion. We consider a single risky asset with
price S and a bank account with price process B. The results below can be
easily extended to the case of multiple assets, but for ease of exposition, we
restrict ourselves to the scalar case. The dynamics are given by
dSt = α(t, St)Stdt+ σ(t, St)StdWt + St−
∫
Z
β(z)µ(dz, dt),
dBt = rdt.
Here W is a scalar Wiener process and µ is a marked point process on the
mark space Z with deterministic intensity measure λ(dz). Furthermore, α(t, s),
σ(t, s) and β(z) are known deterministic functions and r is a known constant.
As before ut denotes the amount of money invested in the stock at time t,
and X is the value process for a self financing portfolio based on S and B. The
dynamics of Xt are then given by
dXt = [rXt + (α(t, St, Yt)− r)u]dt+ σ(t, St, Yt)udWt + ut−
∫
Z
β(z)µ(dz, dt).
Again we study the case of mean-variance utility, i.e.
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [X
u
T ]−
γ
2
V art,x (X
u
T ) .
The extended HJB system now has the form
sup
u
{AuV (t, x, s)−Au(G ◦ g)(t, x, s) + (Hug) (t, x, s)} = 0, (38)
V (T, x, s) = x,
Auˆg = 0, (39)
g(T, x, s) = x.
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As before, we make the Ansatz
V (t, x, s) = A(t)x +B(t, s),
g(t, x, s) = a(t)x+ b(t, s),
A(T ) = 1,
B(T, s) = 0
a(T ) = 1,
b(T, s) = 0.
After some simple but tedious calculations, equation (38) can be re-written as
sup
u
{Atx+Bt +A [rx+ (α− r)u] + αsBs +
1
2
σ2s2Bss +Au
∫
Z
β(z)λ(dz)
+
∫
Z
[B(t, s(1 + β(z))) −B(t, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆βB(t,s,z)
]λ(dz)−
1
2
σ2γ[au+ bss]
2
−
γ
2
∫
Z
[auβ(z) + b(t, s(1 + β(z))) − b(t, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆βb(t,s,z)
]2λ(dz)} = 0 (40)
First, we solve the embedded static problem in (40)
max
u
{
(α − r)Au +Au
∫
Z
β(z)λ(dz)−
1
2
σ2[au+ bss]
2 −
γ
2
∫
Z
[auβ(z) + ∆βb]λ(dz)
}
and obtain the optimal control
uˆ(t, x, s) =
[
α(t, s)− r +
∫
Z β(z)λ(dz)
]
A(t)
γa2(t)[σ2(t, s) +
∫
Z
β2(z)λ(dz)]
−
σ(t, s)bs(t, s)s+
∫
Z β(z)∆βb(t, s, z)λ(dz)
a(t)[σ2(t, s) +
∫
Z
β2(z)λ(dz)]
Again we see that the optimal control does not depend on x. We can plug the
optimal control into equation (40) and as before, we can separate variables to
obtain an ODE for A(t) and a PIDE for B(t, s). The ODE for A is
At + rA = 0
A(T ) = 0
with solution A(t) = er(T−t). The PIDE for B(t, s) becomes
Bt + (α − r)uˆ + αsBs +
1
2
σ2s2Bss +Auˆ
∫
Z
β(z)λ(dz) (41)
+
∫
Z
[∆βB]λ(dz)−
1
2
σ2γ[a(t)uˆ+ bss]
2 (42)
−
γ
2
∫
Z
[a(t)uˆβ(z) + ∆βb]
2λ(dz) = 0 (43)
B(T, s) = 0 (44)
In order to solve this we need to determine the functions a(t) and b(t, s). To
this end we use (39). This can be rewritten as
atx+ bt + [rx + (α− r)uˆ]a+ αsbs +
1
2
σ2s2bss
+auˆ
∫
Z
β(z)λ(dz) +
∫
Z
∆βbλ(dz) = 0. (45)
with the appropriate boundary conditions for a and b. By separation of variables
we obtain the ODE
at + ra = 0,
a(T ) = 1,
and the PIDE
bt + (α− r)uˆa+ αsbs +
1
2
σ2s2bss + auˆ
∫
Z
β(z)λ(dz) +
∫
Z
∆βbλ(dz) = 0,
b(T, s) = 0.
From the ODE we have a(t) = er(T−t) and, plugging this expression into
the previous formula for uˆ, gives us
uˆ =
α− r +
∫
Z β(z)λ(dz)
γ[σ2 +
∫
Z
β2(z)λ(dz)]
e−r(T−t) −
σbss+
∫
Z β(z)∆βbλ(dz)
[σ2 +
∫
Z
β2(z)λ(dz)]
e−r(T−t)
We can now insert this expression, as well as the formula for a, into the
PIDE for b above to obtain the PIDE
bt +
[
α−
[
α− r +
∫
Z β(y)λ(dy)
]
σ2
[σ2 +
∫
Z β
2(y)λ(dy)]
]
sbs +
1
2
σ2s2bss +
[
α− r +
∫
Z β(y)λ(dy)
]2
γ[σ2 +
∫
Z β
2(y)λ(dy)]∫
Z
∆βb(t, s, z)
{
1−
α− r +
∫
Z β(y)λ(dy)
[σ2 +
∫
Z
β2(y)λ(dy)]
β(z)
}
λ(dz) = 0
b(T, s) = 0
This rather forbidding looking equation cannot in general be solved explicitly,
but by applying a Feynman-Kac representation theorem we can represent the
solution as
b(t, s) = EQt,s
[∫ T
t
[
α(τ, Sτ )− r +
∫
Z
β(z)λ(dz)
]2
γ[σ2(τ, Sτ ) +
∫
Z β
2(z)λ(dz)]
dτ
]
. (46)
Here the measure Q is absolutely continuous w.r.t. P , and the likelihood process
Lt =
dQ
dP
on Ft,
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has dynamics given by
dLt = LtϕdWt + Lt−
∫
Z
η(z) [µ(dz, dt)− λ(dz)dt] ,
with ϕ and η given by
ϕ(t, s) = −
[
α(t, s) − r +
∫
Z β(y)λ(dy)
]
σ(t, s)
[σ2(t, s) +
∫
Z
β2(y)λ(dy)]
,
η(t, s, z) = −
[
α(t, s) − r +
∫
Z β(y)λ(dy)
]
[σ2(t, s) +
∫
Z
β2(y)λ(dy)]
β(z).
From the Girsanov Theorem it follows that the Q intensity λQ, of the point
process µ(dt, dz) is given by
λQ(t, s, dz) =
{
1−
[
α(t, s) − r +
∫
Z β(y)λ(dy)
]
[σ2(t, s) +
∫
Z
β2(y)λ(dy)]
β(z)
}
λ(dz),
and that
dWt = −
[
α(t, St)− r +
∫
Z β(y)λ(dy)
]
σ(t, St)
[σ2(t, St) +
∫
Z
β2(y)λ(dy)]
dt+ dWQt
where WQ is Q a Wiener process. A simple calculation now shows that the Q
dynamics of the stock prices S are given by
dSt = rStdt+ Stσ(t, St)dW
Q
t + St−
∫
Z
β(z)
[
µ(dt, dz)− λQ(t, St, dz)
]
so the measure Q is in fact a risk neutral martingale measure, and it is easy
to check that Q is in fact the so called “minimal martingale measure” used in
the context of local risk minimization and developed in [22] and related papers.
This fact was, in a Wiener process framework, observed already in [2].
Performing similar calculations, one can show that the solution of the PIDE
(43)-(44) can be represented as
B(t, s) = EQt,s
[∫ T
t
(α− r +
∫
Z β(z)λ(dz))
2
γ[σ2 +
∫
Z
β2(z)λ(dz)]
dτ
]
−EQt,s
[∫ T
t
1
2
σ2γ[er(T−τ)uˆ+ bss]
2dτ
]
−EQt,s
[∫ T
t
γ
2
∫
Z
[er(T−τ)uˆβ(z) + ∆βb]
2λ(dz)dτ
]
, (47)
with Q as above.
We can finally summarize our results.
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Proposition 10.3 With notation as above, the following hold.
• The optimal amount of money invested in a stock is given by
uˆ =
(α− r +
∫
Z
β(z)λ(dz))
γ[σ2 +
∫
Z
β2(z)λ(dz)]
e−r(T−t)−
(σbss+
∫
Z
β(z)∆βb(z)λ(dz))
[σ2 +
∫
Z
β2(z)λ(dz)]
e−r(T−t)
• The mean-variance utility of the optimal portfolio is given by
V (t, x) = er(T−t)x+ b(t, s)
where b(t, s) is given by stochastic representation (46).
• The expected terminal value of the optimal portfolio is
Et,x [XT ] = xe
r(T−t) +B(t, s)
where x is the present portfolio value and B(t, s) is given by the stochastic
representation (47).
11 Mean-variance control with wealth depen-
dent risk aversion
Going back to the MV portfolio optimization of Section 10, there is a non trivial
problem connected with the solution as presented in Proposition 10.1. We recall
that the MV objective function at time t, given current wealth Xt = x, is given
by
Et,x [XT ]−
γ
2
V art,x [XT ] ,
where XT is the wealth at the end of the time period, and where γ is a given
constant representing the risk aversion of the agent. Referring to Proposition
10.1 we see that, at time t and when total wealth is x, the optimal dollar amount
u(t, x) invested in the risky asset is of the form
u(t, x) = h(t)
where h is a deterministic function of time. In particular this implies that the
dollar amount invested in the risky asset does not depend on current wealth x.
This result is economically unreasonable, and stems from the fact that the
risk aversion parameter γ above is assumed to be a constant. A more natural
idea is that we should explicitly allow γ to depend on current wealth.
We thus go on to study the MV problem with a state dependent risk
aversion. More explicitly we consider an objective function of the form
Et,x [XT ]−
γ(x)
2
V art,x [XT ] ,
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where γ is a deterministic function of present wealth x. The financial market is
as in Section 10.1 so the wealth dynamics are again given by
dXt = [rXt + (α− r)ut]dt+ σutdWt.
This type of problem cannot easily be treated within the framework of [2] or [7],
but it is a simple special case of the theory developed in the present paper. We
now go on to treat this improved model formulation for mean variance portfolio
selection, and we follow our previous paper [5]. See also [4] for a discrete time
version.
11.1 The extended HJB equation for a general γ(x)
Applying the general theory from Section 2 to the objective functional
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [X
u
T ]−
γ(x)
2
V art,x [X
u
T ]
gives us, after a large number of elementary calculations, the following result
(see [5] for details). We use the notation β = α− r.
Proposition 11.1 The extended HJB system takes the following form:
Vt + sup
u∈R
{
(rx + βu)
[
Vx − fy −
γ′(x)
2
g2
]
+
1
2
σ2u2
[
Vxx − fyy − 2fxy −
γ′′(x)
2
g2 − 2γ′(x)ggx − γ(x)g
2
x
]}
= 0,
ft(t, x, y) + (rx + βuˆ) fx(t, x, y) +
1
2
σ2uˆ2fxx(t, x, y) = 0,
gt(t, x) + (rx + βuˆ) gx(t, x) +
1
2
σ2uˆ2gxx(t, x) = 0.
11.2 A special choice of γ(x)
One way of finding a natural candidate of γ is to perform a dimension analysis.
In the reward function
J(t, x,u) = Et,x [X
u
T ]−
γ(x)
2
V art,x [X
u
T ]
we see that the first term Et,x [X
u
T ] has the dimension (dollar). The term
V art,x [X
u
T ] has the dimension (dollar)
2, so in order to have a reward function
measured in dollars we have to choose γ in such a way that γ(x) has the di-
mension (dollar)−1. The most obvious way to accomplish this is of course to
specify γ as
γ(x) =
γ
x
,
where, with a slight abuse of notation, the occurrence of γ in the right hand
side denotes a constant. This is also very natural from an economic point of
view since the risk aversion will now be decreasing in wealth.
38
We now conjecture that uˆ is linear in x so we make the Ansatz
uˆ(t, x) = c(t)x
for some deterministic function c. If this is the case, then X will be GBM so
we will have
Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
= a(t)x, (48)
Et,x
[(
X uˆT
)2]
= b(t)x2, (49)
for some deterministic functions a and b. We recall the probabilistic interpreta-
tions
f(t, x, y) = Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
−
γ(y)
2
Et,x
[(
X uˆT
)2]
,
g(t, x) = Et,x
[
X uˆT
]
.
This leads to the Ansatz
f(t, x, y) = a(t)x−
γ
2y
b(t)x2,
g(t, x) = a(t)x.
Plugging these expressions into the extended HJB system gives us the
following results.
Proposition 11.2 For the case when γ(x) = γx , the equilibrium control is given
by
uˆ(t, x) =
β
γσ2
a(t) + γ
[
a2(t)− b(t)
]
b(t)
x
where a and b solves the ODE system
a˙+
(
r +
β2
γσ2b
(
a+ γ
[
a2 − b
]))
a = 0,
a(T, x) = 1,
b˙+
{
2
(
r +
β2
γσ2b
(
a+ γ
[
a2 − b
]))
+
β2
γ2σ2b2
(
a+ γ
[
a2 − b
])2}
b = 0,
b(T, x) = 1.
The equilibrium value function V is given by
V (t, x) =
{
a(t) +
γ
2
[
a2(t)− b(t)
]}
x.
Remark 11.1 We see that the optimal dollar value uˆ invested in the risky asset
is now linear in wealth. From an economic point of view this is a much nicer
result than the one obtained from the ‘naive” mean variance model where uˆ was
constant as a function of x.
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12 The inconsistent linear quadratic regulator
To illustrate how the theory works in another simple case, we consider a small
variation of the classical linear quadratic regulator. The model is specified as
follows.
• The value functional for Player t is given by
Et,x
[
1
2
∫ T
t
u2sds
]
+
γ
2
Et,x
[
(XT − x)
2
]
where γ is a positive constant.
• The state process X is scalar with dynamics
dXt = [aXt + but] dt+ σdWt,
where a, b and σ are given constants.
• The control u is scalar with no constraints.
This is a time inconsistent version of the classical linear quadratic regulator.
Loosely speaking we want control the system so that the final sate XT is close
to x while at the same time keeping the control energy (formalized by the
integral term) is small. The time inconsistency stems from the fact that the
target point x = Xt is changing as time goes by. In discrete time this problem
is studied in [4].
For this problem we have
F (x, y) =
γ
2
(y − x)2,
H(u) =
1
2
u2
and as usual we introduce the functions fy(t, x) and f(t, x, x) by
fy(t, x) = Et,x
[∫ T
t
1
2
uˆ2s
(
X uˆs
)
ds+
(
X uˆT − y
)2]
,
f(t, x, y) = fy(t, x).
The extended HJB system takes the form
inf
u
{
1
2
u2 +Aufx(t, x)
}
= 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Auˆfy(t, x) +
1
2
uˆ2t (x) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
fy(T, x) =
γ
2
(x− y)2.
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From the X dynamics we see that
Au =
∂
∂t
+ (ax+ bu)
∂
∂x
+
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂x2
.
We thus obtain the following form of the HJB equation, where for shortness
of notation we denote partial derivatives by lower case index so, for example,
fx =
∂f
∂x .
inf
u
{
1
2
u2 + ft(t, x, x) + (ax+ bu)fx(t, x, x) +
1
2
σ2fxx(t, x, x)
}
= 0,
f(T, x, x) = 0.
The coupled system for fy is given by
fyt (t, x) + [ax+ buˆ(t, x)] f
y
x (t, x) +
1
2
σ2fyxx(t, x) +
1
2
uˆ2(t, x) = 0,
fy(T, x) =
γ
2
(x − y)2.
The first order condition in the HJB equation gives us
uˆ(t, x) = −bfx(t, x, x)
and, inspired of the standard regulator problem, we now make the Ansatz (at-
tempted solution)
f(t, x, y) = A(t)x2 +B(t)y2 + C(t)xy +D(t)x + F (t)y +H(t), (50)
where all coefficients are deterministic functions of time. We now insert the
Ansatz into the HJB system, and perform a number of extremely boring calcu-
lations. As a result of these calculations, it turns out that the variables separate
in the expected way and we have the following result.
Proposition 12.1 For the time inconsistent regulator, we have the structure
(50), where the coefficient functions solve the following system of ODE:s.
At + 2aA− 2b
2A(2A+ C) +
1
2
b2(2A+ C)2 = 0
Bt = 0
Ct + aC − b
2C(2A+ C) = 0
Dt + aD − 2b
2AD = 0
Ft − b
2CD = 0
Ht −
1
2
b2D2 + σ2A = 0
With boundary conditions
A(T ) =
γ
2
, B(T ) =
γ
2
, C(T ) = −γ,
D(T ) = 0, F (T ) = 0, H(T ) = 0.
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13 A Cox-Ingersoll-Ross production economy with
time inconsistent preferences
In this section we apply the previously developed theory to a rather detailed
study of a general equilibrium model for a production economy with time in-
consistent preferences. The model under consideration is a time inconsistent
analogue of the classic Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model in [6]. Our main objective
is to investigate the structure of the equilibrium short rate, the equilibrium
Girsanov kernel, and the equilibrium stochastic discount factor.
There are a few earlier papers on equilibrium with time inconsistent pref-
erences. In [1] and [17] the authors study continuous time equilibrium models
of a particular type of time inconsistency, namely non-exponential discounting.
While [1] considers a deterministic neoclassical model of economic growth, [17]
analyze general equilibrium in a stochastic endowment economy.
Our present study is much inspired by the earlier paper [14] which, in
very great detail, studies equilibrium in a very general setting of an endowment
economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences that is not limited to the
particular case of non-exponential discounting.
Unlike the papers mentioned above, which all studies endowment models,
we study a stochastic production economy of Cox-Ingersoll-Ross type.
13.1 The Model
We start with some formal assumptions concerning the production technology.
Assumption 13.1 We assume that there exists a constant returns to scale
physical production technology process S with dynamics
dSt = αStdt+ StσdWt. (51)
The economic agents can invest unlimited positive amounts in this technology,
but since it is a matter of physical investment, short positions are not allowed.
More concretely this means that at any time you are allowed to invest
dollars in the production process. If you, at time t, invest q dollars, and wait
until time u then you will receive the amount of q ·Su/St in dollars. In particular
we see that the return on the investment is linear in q, hence the term “constant
returns to scale”. Since this is a matter of physical investment, short-selling is
not allowed.
A moment of reflection shows that, from a purely formal point of view,
investment in the technology S is in fact equivalent to the possibility of investing
in a risky asset with price process S, but again with the constraint that short-
selling is not allowed.
We also need a risk free asset, and this is provided by the next assumption.
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Assumption 13.2 We assume that there exists a risk free asset in zero net
supply with dynamics
dBt = rtBtdt,
where r is the short rate process, which will be determined endogenously. The
risk free rate r is assumed to be of the form
rt = r(t,Xt)
where X denotes the portfolio value of the representative investor (to be defined
below).
Interpreting the production technology S as above, the wealth dynamics
will be given by
dXt = Xtut(α− rt)dt+ (rtXt − ct)dt+XtutσdWt.
where u is the portfolio weight on production, so 1− u is the weight on the risk
free asset. Finally we need an economic agent.
Assumption 13.3 We assume that there exists a representative agent who, at
every point (t, x), wishes to maximize the reward functional
Et,x
[∫ T
t
U(t, x, s, cs)ds
]
. (52)
13.2 Equilibrium definitions
We now go on to study equilibrium in our model. We will in fact have two
equilibrium concepts
• Intrapersonal equilibrium.
• Market equilibrium.
The intrapersonal equilibrium is related to the lack of time consistency in pref-
erences, whereas the market equilibrium is related to market clearing. We now
discuss these concepts in more detail.
13.2.1 Intrapersonal equilibrium
Consider, for a given short rate function r(t, x) the control problem with reward
functional
Et,x
[∫ T
t
U(t, x, s, cs)ds
]
.
and wealth dynamics
dXt = Xtut(α− rt)dt+ (rtXt − ct)dt+XtutσdWt.
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where rt is shorthand for r(t,Xt). If the agent wants to maximize the reward
functional for every initial point (t, x) then, because of the appearance of (t, x)
in the utility function U , this is a time inconsistent control problem. In order
to handle this situation we use the game theoretic setup and results developed
in Sections 1-6 above. This subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept is hence-
forth referred to as the intrapersonal equilibrium.
13.2.2 Market equilibrium
By a market equilibrium we mean a situation where the agent follows an
intrapersonal equilibrium strategy, and where the market clears for the risk free
asset. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 13.1 A market equilibrium of the model is a triple of real valued
functions {cˆ(t, x), uˆ(t, x), r(t, x)} such that the following hold.
1. Given the risk free rate process r(t, x), the intrapersonal equilibrium con-
sumption and investment are given by cˆ and uˆ respectively.
2. The market clears for the risk free asset, i.e.
uˆ(t, x) ≡ 1.
13.3 Main goals of the study
As will be seen below, there will be a unique equilibrium martingale measure Q
with corresponding likelihood process L = dQ/dP , where L has dynamics
dLt = LtϕtdWt.
The process ϕ will be referred to as the equilibrium Girsanov kernel. There will
also be a equilibrium short rate process r, which will be related to ϕ by the
standard no arbitrage relation
r(t, x) = α+ ϕ(t, x)σ, (53)
which says that S/B is a Q-martingale. There will also be a unique equilibrium
stochastic discount factor M defined by
Mt = e
−
∫
t
0
rsdsLt.
For ease of notation we will, however, only identify the stochastic discount factor
M , up to a multiplicative constant, so for any arbitrage free (non dividend) price
process pt we will have the pricing equation
ps =
1
Ms
EP [Mtpt| Fs] .
Our goal is to obtain expressions for ϕ, r and M .
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13.4 The extended HJB equation
In order to determine the intrapersonal equilibrium we use the results from
Section 7.2. The extended HJB equation (27) now reads as
sup
u≥0,c≥0
{
U(t, x, t, c) +Au,cf tx(t, x)
}
= 0 (54)
and f sy is determined by
Auˆ,cˆf sy(t, x) + U (s, y, t, cˆ(t, x)) = 0 (55)
with the probabilistic representation
f sy(t, x) = Et,x
[∫ T
t
U
(
s, y, τ, cˆ(τ,X uˆτ )
)
dτ
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (56)
The term Au,cf tx(t, x) is given by
Au,cf tx(t, x) = ft + xu (α− r) fx + (rx − c)fx +
1
2
x2u2σ2fxx (57)
where f and the derivatives are evaluated at (t, x, t, x) and where we have used
the notation
f(t, x, s, y) = f sy(t, x),
ft(t, x, s, y) =
∂f
∂t
(t, x, s, y),
fx(t, x, s, y) =
∂f
∂x
(t, x, s, y),
fxx(t, x, s, y) =
∂2f
∂x2
(t, x, s, y).
The first order conditions for an interior optimum are
Uc(t, x, t, cˆ) = fx(t, x, t, x) (58)
uˆ = −
(
α− r
σ2
)
fx(t, x, t, x)
xfxx(t, x, t, x)
. (59)
13.5 Determining market equilibrium
In order to determine the market equilibrium we use the equilibrium condition
uˆ = 1. Plugging this into (59) we immediately obtain our first result.
Proposition 13.1 With assumptions as above the following hold.
• The equilibrium short rate is given by
r(t, x) = α+ σ2
xfxx(t, x, t, x)
fx(t, x, t, x)
. (60)
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• The equilibrium Girsanov kernel ϕ is given by
ϕ(t, x) = σ
xfxx(t, x, t, x)
fx(t, x, t, x)
. (61)
• The extended equilibrium HJB system has the form
U(t, x, t, cˆ) + ft + (αx− cˆ) fx +
1
2
x2σ2fxx = 0, (62)
Acˆf sy(t, x) + U (s, y, t, cˆ(t, x)) = 0 (63)
• The equilibrium consumption cˆ is determined by the first order condition
Uc(t, x, t, cˆ) = fx(t, x, t, x) (64)
• The term Acˆf tx(t, x) is given by
Acˆf tx(t, x) = ft + x (α− r) fx + (rx − cˆ)fx +
1
2
x2σ2fxx (65)
• The equilibrium X dynamics are given by
dXt = (αXt − cˆt) dt+XtσdWt. (66)
Proof. The formula (61) follows from (60) and (53). The other results are
obvious.
13.6 Recap of standard results
We can compare the results above with the standard case where the utility
functional for the agent is of the time consistent form
Et,x
[∫ T
t
U(s, cs)ds
]
.
In this case we have a standard HJB equation of the form
sup
u∈R,c≥0
{U(t, c) +Au,cV (t, x)} = 0. (67)
and the equilibrium quantities are given by the well known expressions
r(t, x) = α+ σ2
xVxx(t, x)
Vx(t, x)
, (68)
ϕ(t, x) = σ
xVxx(t, x)
Vx(t, x)
. (69)
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We note the strong structural similarities between the old and the new formulas,
but we also note important differences. Let us take the formulas for the equilib-
rium short rate r as an example. We recall the standard and time inconsistent
formulas
r(t, x) = α+ σ2
xVxx(t, x)
Vx(t, x)
, (70)
r(t, x) = α+ σ2
xfxx(t, x, t, x)
fx(t, x, t, x)
. (71)
For the time inconsistent case we do have the relation V e(t, x) = f(t, x, t, x)
(where temporarily, and for the sake of clearness, V e denotes the equilibrium
value function) so it is tempting to think that we should be able to write (71)
as
r(t, x) = α+ σ2
xV exx(t, x)
V ex (t, x)
which would be structurally identical to (70). Not however, that while we do
have f(t, x, t, x) = V e(t, x), the partial derivative fx(t, x, t, x) is not equal to
V ex (t, x). The reason is that in fx(t, x, t, x), the partial differential operator only
acts on the first occurrence of x in f(t, x, t, x), whereas V ex (t, x) will be the total
x-derivative of f(t, x, t, x).
13.7 The stochastic discount factor
We now go on to investigate our main object of interest, namely the equilibrium
stochastic discount factor M . We recall from general arbitrage theory that
Mt = e
−
∫
t
0
ruduLt (72)
where L is the likelihood process
Lt =
dQ
dP
, on Ft
with dynamics
dLt = LtϕtdWt.
From this we immediately obtain the M dynamics as
dMt = −rtMtdt+MtϕtdWt, (73)
so we can identify the short rate r and the Girsanov kernel ϕ from the dynamics
of M .
From Proposition 13.1 we know r and ϕ, so in principle we have in fact
already determinedM , but we now want to investigate the relation betweenM ,
the direct utility function U , and the indirect utility function f in the extended
HJB equation.
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We recall from standard theory that for the usual time consistent case the
(non normalized) stochastic discount factor M is given by
Mt = Vx(t,Xt),
or equivalently by
Mt = Uc(t, ct)
along the equilibrium path. In our present setting we have
V (t, x) = f(t, x, t, x),
so a conjecture would perhaps be that the stochastic discount factor for the time
inconsistent case is given by at least one of the formulas
Mt = Vx(t,Xt),
Mt = fx(t,Xt, t,Xt),
Mt = Uc(t,Xt, t, ct)
along the equilibrium path. In order to check if any of these formulas are correct
we only have to compute the corresponding differential dMt and check whether
it satisfies (73). It is then easily seen that none of the formulas for M are
correct. The situation is in thus more complicated and we now go on to derive
the correct representation of the stochastic discount factor.
13.7.1 A representation formula for M
We now go back to the time inconsistent case with utility of the form
Et,x
[∫ T
t
U(t, x, s, cs)ds
]
.
We will, below, present a representation for the stochastic discount factor M in
the production economy, but first we need to introduce some new notation.
Definition 13.2 Let X be a (possibly vector valued) semimartingale and let
Y be an optional process. For a C2 function f(x, y) we introduce the “partial
stochastic differential” ∂x by the formula
∂xf(Xt, Yt) = df(Xt, y), evaluated at y = Yt. (74)
The intuitive interpretation of this is that
∂xf(Xt, Yt) = f(Xt+dt, Yt)− f(Xt, Yt), (75)
and we have the following proposition, which generalizes the standard result for
the time consistent theory.
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Theorem 13.1 The stochastic discount factor M is determined by
d (lnMt) = ∂t,x ln fx(t,Xt, t,Xt), (76)
where the partial differential ∂t,x only operates on the variables (t, x) in fx(t, x, s, y).
Alternatively we can write
Mt = Uc (t,Xt, t, cˆt) · e
Zt , (77)
where Z is determined by
dZt = ∂tx ln fx (t,Xt, t,Xt)− d ln fx (t,Xt, t,Xt) . (78)
Remark 13.1 We remark here on the structural similarity of the stochastic
discount factor to the result obtained in [14].
Remark 13.2 For a more concrete interpretation of this result, see Section
13.7.2 below. Note again that the operator ∂tx in (78) only acts on the first
occurrence of t and Xt in fx (t,Xt, t,Xt) whereas the operator d acts on the
entire process t 7−→ fx (t,Xt, t,Xt).
Proof. Formulas (77)-(78) follows from (76) and the first order condition
Uc (t,Xt, t, cˆt) = fx (t,Xt, t,Xt). It thus remains to prove (76).
From (73) it follows that we need to show that
∂t,x ln fx(t,Xt, t,Xt) = −
{
rt +
1
2
ϕ2t
}
dt+ ϕtdWt (79)
where r and ϕ are given by (60)-(61). Applying Ito and the definition of ∂t,x
we obtain
∂t,x ln fx(t,Xt, t,Xt) = A(t,Xt)dt+B(t,Xt)dWt,
where
A(t, x) =
1
fx
{
fxt + (αx − cˆ) fxx +
1
2
σ2x2fxxx −
1
2
σ2x2
f2xx
fx
}
, (80)
B(t, x) = σx
fxx
fx
. (81)
From (61) we see that indeed B(t, x) = ϕ(t, x) so, using (60), it remains to show
that
A(t, x) = −
{
α+ σ2x
fxx
fx
+
1
2
σ2x2
fxx
fx
}
. (82)
To show this we differentiate the equilibrium HJB equation (62), use the first
order condition Uc = fx, and obtain
Ux + fty + ftx + (αx − cˆ) fxx + (αx− cˆ) fxy + αfx
+σ2xfxx +
1
2
σ2x2fxxy +
1
2
σ2x2fxxx = 0, (83)
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where ftx = ftx(t, x, t, x) and similarly for other derivatives, cˆ = cˆ(t, x) and
Ux = Ux (t, x, t, cˆ(t, x)). From the extended HJB system we also recall the PDE
for f sy as
f syt (t, x) + (αx − cˆ) f
sy
x (t, x) +
1
2
σ2x2f syxx(t, x) + U(s, y, t, cˆ) = 0
Differentiating this equation w.r.t. the variable y and evaluating at (t, x, t, x)
and cˆ(t, x) we obtain
fty + (αx− cˆ) fxy +
1
2
σ2x2fxxy + Ux = 0. (84)
We can now plug this into (83) to obtain
ftx + (αx− cˆ) fxx + αfx + σ
2xfxx +
1
2
σ2x2fxxx = 0.
Plugging this into (80) we can write A as
A(t, x) = −
{
α+ σ2x
fxx
fx
+
1
2
σ2x2
f2xx
fx
}
which is exactly (82).
13.7.2 Interpreting the representation formula
The representation formula (76) does not prima facie seem to have a natural
interpretation. We can of course write M as
Mt = e
∫
t
0
∂t,x ln fx(s,Xs,s,Xs)
but this does not seem to give much insight. In order to get a deeper under-
standing we recall that for any (non dividend) asset price process p we have the
valuation formula
ps = E
P
[
Mt
Ms
pt
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
it is therefore natural to make the following definition.
Definition 13.3 For any s < t we define the (s, t)-stochastic discount factor
Mst by
Mst =
Mt
Ms
. (85)
We thus have a natural multiplicative structure in the sense that for s < u < t
we have
Mst =Msu ·Mut.
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The economic interpretation of Mst is thus that (via conditional expectation)
it discounts the value of a stochastic claim at time t back to time s. It is now
natural to look at the infinitesimal version ofMst. This object would intuitively
be defined by the formula
Mt,t+dt =
Mt+dt
Mt
(86)
and it would tell us how we discount on the infinitesimal scale from time t+ dt
back to time t.
In order to make (86) more precise we note that we can write it as
Mt,t+dt = e
lnMt+dt−lnMt = ed(lnMt)
and this motivates the following formal definition.
Definition 13.4 The log stochastic discount factor mt is defined by
mt = lnMt (87)
We thus have
Mst = e
mt−ms
and the informal interpretation
Mt,t+dt = e
dmt .
Theorem 13.1 shows that
dmt = ∂t,x ln fx(t,Xt, t,Xt),
so we have the interpretation
Mt,t+dt = e
∂t,x ln fx(t,Xt,t,Xt)
Using the interpretation (75) and doing some simple calculations we finally
obtain the following (informal) result.
Proposition 13.2 With notation as above we have the following informal rep-
resentation, corresponding to equation (76).
Mt+dt
Mt
=
fx(t+ dt,Xt+dt, t,Xt)
fx(t,Xt, t,Xt)
. (88)
This can also be written as
Mt+dt
Mt
=
Uc(t+ dt, t+ dt,Xt+dt, cˆt+dt)
Uc(t, t,Xt, cˆt)
·
fx(t+ dt,Xt+dt, t,Xt)
fx(t+ dt,Xt+dt, t+ dt,Xt+dt)
(89)
corresponding to equations (77)-(78).
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Formula (88) has a natural economic interpretation which can be seen from a
dimension argument. The valuation formula for a price process p will, on the
infinitesimal scale, read as
pt = E
P
[
fx(t+ dt,Xt+dt, t,Xt)
fx(t,Xt, t,Xt)
pt+dt
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
If we denote the dimension of money by dollars we have the following relations,
where dim denotes dimension
dim [fx(t+ dt,Xt+dt, t,Xt)] = marginal utility, at t, of dollars at t+ dt.
dim [fx(t,Xt, t,Xt)] = marginal utility, at t, of dollars at t.
Since pt+dt has dimension dollars at t + dt, we see that by multiplying with
the factor fx(t,Xt, t + dt,Xt+dt) transforms this dollar amount into marginal
utility at time t. Dividing by fx(t,Xt, t,Xt) gives us dollars at t, which is the
dimension of pt.
13.8 Equilibrium with non-exponential discounting
A case of particular interest occurs when the utility function is of the form
U(t, x, s, cs) = β(s− t)U(cs)
so the utility functional has the form
Et,x
[∫ T
t
β(s− t)U(cs)ds
]
.
13.8.1 Generalities
In the case of non exponential discounting it is natural to consider the case with
infinite horizon. We will thus assume that T =∞ so we have the functional
Et,x
[∫ ∞
t
β(τ − t)U(cτ )dτ
]
. (90)
The function f(t, x, s, y) will now be of the form f(t, x, s) and, because of the
time invariance, it is natural to look for time invariant equilibria where
uˆ(t, x) = uˆ(x),
V (t, x) = V (x),
f(t, x, s) = g(t− s, x),
V (x) = g(0, x).
Observing that fx(t, x, t) = gx(0, x) = Vx(x) and similarly for second order
derivatives, we may now restate proposition 13.1.
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Proposition 13.3 With assumptions as above the following hold.
• The equilibrium short rate is given by
r(x) = α+ σ2
xVxx(x)
Vx(x)
. (91)
• The equilibrium Girsanov kernel ϕ is given by
ϕ(x) = σ
xVxx(x)
Vx(x)
. (92)
• The extended equilibrium HJB system has the form
U(cˆ) + gt(0, x) + (αx− cˆ) gx(0, x) +
1
2
x2σ2gxx(0, x) = 0, (93)
Acˆg(t, x) + β(t)U (cˆ(x)) = 0, (94)
• The function g has the representation
g(t, x) = E0,x
[∫ ∞
0
β(t+ s)U (cˆs) ds
]
(95)
• The equilibrium consumption cˆ is determined by the first order condition
Uc(cˆ) = gx(0, x) (96)
• The term Acˆg(t, x) is given by
Acˆg(t, x) = gt(t, x) + x [α− cˆ(x)] gx(t, x) +
1
2
x2σ2gxx(t, x) (97)
• The equilibrium X dynamics are given by
dXt = (αXt − cˆt) dt+XtσdWt. (98)
We see that the short rate r and the Girsanov kernel ϕ has exactly the same
structural form as the standard case formulas (68)-(69). We now move to the
stochastic discount factor and after some calculations we have the following
version of Theorem 13.1.
Proposition 13.4 The stochastic discount factor M is determined by
d ln (Mt) = d ln gx(t,Xt) (99)
where gx is evaluated at (0, Xt). Alternatively, we can write M as
Mt = Uc(cˆt) · exp
{∫ t
0
gxt(0, Xs)
gx(0, Xs)
ds
}
(100)
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We can also refer to Proposition 13.2 and conclude that the infinitesimal SDF
is given by the formula
Mt+dt
Mt
=
gx (dt,Xt+dt)
gx(0, Xt)
, (101)
or, alternatively, by the formula
Mt+dt
Mt
=
Uc (cˆt+dt)
Uc (cˆt)
·
gx (dt,Xt+dt)
gx (0, Xt+dt)
. (102)
13.8.2 Log utility
We now specialize to the case of log utility, so the utility functional has the form
Et,x
[∫ ∞
t
β(τ − t) ln (cτ ) dτ
]
. (103)
Given some experience from the standard time consistent case, we now make
the Ansatz
g(t, x) = at ln(x) + bt, (104)
where a and b are deterministic functions of time. The natural boundary con-
ditions are
lim
t→∞
at = 0, lim
t→∞
bt = 0. (105)
With this Ansatz we have
gt = a˙ ln(x) + b˙, gx =
a
x
, gxx = −
a
x2
, (106)
so from the first order condition (96) for c we obtain
cˆ(x) =
x
a0
. (107)
From Proposition 13.3 we obtain the short rate and the Girsanov kernel as
r = α− σ2, ϕ = −σ. (108)
The function a and b are determined by (94). We obtain
a˙ ln(x) + b˙+ aσ2 +
(
α− σ2
)
a−
a
a0
−
σ2
2
a+ β ln(x) − β ln (a0) = 0
We thus obtain the ODE
a˙t = −β(t), (109)
and with the boundary condition limt→∞ at = 0 this gives us
at =
∫ ∞
t
β(s)ds. (110)
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We also have an obvious ODE for b, but this is of little interest for us.
In order to determine the SDF we use Proposition 13.4 and compute
gxt(0, x)
gx(0, x)
=
a˙0
a0
= −
1
a0
.
and we have the following result.
Proposition 13.5 For the case of log utility, the stochastic discount factor is
given by
Mt =
1
Xt
· e−t/a0 . (111)
where
a0 =
∫ ∞
0
β(s)ds.
13.8.3 Power utility
We now turn to the more complicate case of power utility so we have
U(c) =
cγ
γ
where γ < 1. We make the obvious Ansatz
g(t, x) = at
xγ
γ
(112)
We readily obtain
gt = a˙
xγ
γ
, gx = ax
γ−1, gxx = a(γ − 1)x
γ−2, gxt = a˙x
γ−1 (113)
The first order condition for c is
cγ−1 = a0x
γ−1
so the equilibrium consumption is given by
cˆ(x) = Dx (114)
where
D = a
−1/(1−γ)
0
From Proposition 13.3 we obtain the short rate and the Girsanov kernel as
ϕ = −σ(1− γ),
r = α− σ2(1 − γ).
The function a is again determined by (94). We obtain
a˙
xγ
γ
+ xaσ2(1− γ)xγ−1 + xa (r −D) xγ−1 + a
σ2
2
x2(γ − 1)xγ−2 + β
Dγxγ
γ
= 0
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which gives us the linear ODE
a˙t +Aat +Bβ(t) = 0.
with
A = α−D −
σ2
2
(1− γ),
B =
Dγ
γ
The function a is thus given by
at = a0e
−At −B
∫ t
0
e−A(t−s)β(s)ds. (115)
Using Proposition 13.4 we thus have the following result.
Proposition 13.6 For the case of power utility the stochastic discount factor
is given by
Mt = Xt
γ−1e
a˙0
a0
t
From these examples with non exponential discounting we see that the risk
free rate and Girsanov kernel only depend on the production opportunities in the
economy. These objects are unaffected by the time inconsistency stemming from
non-exponential discounting. Equilibrium consumption, however, is determined
by the discounting function of the representative agent. In particular, we see
that non exponential discounting has an effect on the marginal propensity to
consume from wealth and thus affects the equilibrium level of wealth in the
economy.
14 Conclusion and future research
In this paper we have presented a fairly general class of time inconsistent stochas-
tic control problems. Using a game theoretic perspective we have derived a
system of equations for the determination of the subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium control, as well as for the corresponding equilibrium value function. The
system is an extension of the standard dynamic programming equation for time
consistent problems. We have studied a couple of concrete examples, and in
particular we have studied the effect of time inconsistency in the framework of
general equilibrium for a production economy.
Some obvious open research problems are the following.
• In Section 4.1 we informally derived the continuous time extended HJB
system as a limit using a discretization argument. It would obviously
be valuable to have a theorem which rigorously proves convergence of
the discrete time theory to the continuous time limit. For the quadratic
case, this is done in [7], but the general problem is completely open (and
probably very hard).
56
• A related (hard) open problem is to prove existence and/or uniqueness for
solutions of the extended HJB system.
• The present theory depends critically on the Markovian structure of the
model. It would be interesting to see what can be one without this as-
sumption.
• The equilibrium model in Section 13 can be extended to a multidimen-
sional model with several underlying factors. This is the subject of a
forthcoming paper.
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